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Abstract:  
This paper provides a theoretical justification for the doctrine of equivalents in patent law that is 
based on the contractarian view of the patent grant. 
Introduction 
In Actavis v Eli Lilly,1 the Supreme Court introduced the concept of infringement by equivalents in UK 
patent law. Lord Neuberger justified his decision by arguing that “adopting a normal approach to 
[the] interpretation [of patent claims] would risk depriving patentees of a proper measure of 
protection […].”2 At a theoretical level, the doctrine of equivalents could be justified as a corollary of 
the patent bargain theory. Inventors are invited to incur the kind of investments in research and 
development that are eventually rewarded by the patent system. Hence, the inventors’ investments 
are relationship-specific. After outlining some practical problems associated with the determination 
of patent scope, this paper will highlight the nature of the patent bargain as a relational contract. 
Someone engaging in relationship-specific investments is exposed to the risk of opportunistic 
behaviour at an ex post stage because such investments lose their value outside the context of the 
existing relationship. When third parties find a way to design around the patent claims in order to 
utilise the incentive concept encapsulated therein, the patent loses its market value since the 
patentee has no outside option to exploit his inventive efforts. Opportunism is examined as a lay, 
legal and economic term with a view to specifying the type of conduct that qualifies as opportunistic 
for the purposes of patent law. 
British patent law has long adhered to the purposive approach which aligns claim construction with 
the interpretation of contracts. Compared to the textualist interpretative method, contextualism 
features the advantage of being more suitable for considering the interest position of the party that 
has incurred relationship-specific investments. Courts have been particularly effective in combating 
some very specific forms of blatant opportunism when administering the “pith and marrow” 
doctrine or assessing patent infringement through the lens of the more advanced concept of 
purposive claim construction, which marked the evolutionary pinnacle of the traditional British 
approach to the determination of patent scope. 
The main drawback of those infringement theories has been that they readily assumed a virtually 
perfect ability of applicants to design optimally inclusive claims. In practice, however, this is often 
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impossible or comes at a very high cost of drafting, thereby leaving room for opportunism to emerge 
as third parties have a chance to exploit a patented inventive concept by skilfully evading the 
contextual meaning of the claims’ wording. This not only reduces the incentives of inventors to 
innovate but, equally crucial, it decelerates the process of technical disclosure. Optimal drafting 
might be time-consuming or require the applicant to try out some things first. Such a situation is 
comparable to a state of contractual incompleteness attributable to high transaction costs which is 
bound to give rise to a hold-up problem. In a fashion that is quite similar to that of default rules in 
contract law, the doctrine of equivalents essentially reconstructs the complete patent bargain to 
rectify the impossibility or the potential inefficiencies associated with an attempt to draft optimally 
inclusive patent claims, the paper argues. To illustrate all of these points, this paper reviews some of 
the most important cases on the interpretation of patent claims in the UK. 
The legal dimension of a practical problem 
Patent law has to strike a balance between the patentee’s interest in internalizing the full market 
value of his inventive idea, whose protection secures incentives to innovate, and the value of legal 
certainty about the scope of IP (intellectual property) rights, which are vital to market entry and 
competition. Patent claims serve the paramount function of notice as they inform other economic 
operators about the boundaries of the property upon which they are not supposed to trespass and, 
most importantly, the types of activity in which they are allowed to engage without infringing earlier 
rights. In practice, however, the patent claims often fail to capture the inventive idea in its entirety 
and are taken to refer to subject matter that simply constitutes an expression thereof. That being 
the case, it would be possible in many instances for third parties to design around the claims’ 
wording and yet be able to compete with the patentee by offering a highly substitutable product 
implementing the same inventive concept. Let’s reconsider the following well-celebrated examples 
from case law. 
The Catnic3 litigation concerned an inventor who came up with a new type of lintel. Such load-
bearing beams have been placed on top of wall openings ever since to absorb the weight of 
brickwork that doors or windows, for instance, cannot sustain. Up to that point, the most advanced 
lintels were made of reinforced concrete or steel girders. The patentee’s inventive idea was to use a 
hollow steel box instead, which had been configured to optimally increase its load bearing capacity. 
In the patent claims, the product was described as comprising two horizontal plates that were 
“substantially parallel”4 to each other and two supporting members one of which was “extending 
vertically from or from near the rear edge of the first horizontal plate or part to join with the second 
plate or part adjacent its rear edge.”5 Patent infringement proceedings were brought against 
competitors who marketed a similar lintel whose weight bearing power was reduced by 0.6 percent 
due to its rear support member having been made at an angle of 84 rather than 90 degrees. 
In Improver v Remington,6 the infringement action rested on the UK patent protecting the Epilady, 
the first hair epilating device. A curved spring rotated rapidly by an electric motor would trap and 
pull out hair by the roots as half of its windings opened out while the rest closed at the same time. 
The claims made reference to a “helical spring”.7 Remington’s “Smooth and Silky” epilator 
substituted that element of the earlier invention for a slotted rubber rod. 
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The plaintiff in Kirin-Amgen8 had obtained a process patent for the production of erythropoietin 
(EPO) after isolating and sequencing the gene capable of expressing that protein. According to the 
patent’s teachings, the relevant DNA sequence had to be inserted into a host cell for cultivation. 
Thanks to that invention, it became possible to artificially produce large quantities of EPO, which has 
been used, among other functions, in the treatment of anaemia. A dispute arose as to whether an 
alternative process based on gene activation technology could be subsumed under the claims of that 
patent. Instead of introducing a DNA sequence into a host cell, the defendant’s method operated by 
inserting a gene activator (a promoter sequence of DNA) into the organism. Promoters would be 
placed at the appropriate places before dormant DNA sequences within cells that would not have 
otherwise expressed erythropoietin to activate them. In essence, the defendant’s way of dealing 
with the technical problem was to switch on the EPO gene in cells where this was supposed to 
remain inactive because those cells were initially dedicated to the production of other proteins. In 
contrast, the patent in suit claimed a process that was reliant upon an “exogenous” DNA sequence. 
The Supreme Court was called upon to rule on issues of law pertaining to patent infringement in the 
landmark case of Actavis v Eli Lilly,9 which elaborated upon a long line of precedents attending to the 
same complex problem. The earlier invention taught the manufacture of a drug based on 
pemetrexed acid, which was already known as a potent anti-cancer agent. In the pharmaceutical 
industry, it is common to combine acids featuring potential therapeutic applications with an 
appropriate base in order to produce a salt. Somewhat oversimplified, bases are substances that lack 
hydrogens whereas acids possess a surplus of such atoms. Combining these two would normally give 
rise to a neutralization reaction that reduces the toxicity of the acid while retaining its desirable 
attributes. Soap, for instance, is often the product of a reaction between a fatty acid obtained from 
some poor fleshy animal and a base like sodium or potassium. Hence, getting to an effective drug is 
often a matter of obtaining the salt form of an acid. A single acid may react with many different 
bases to form a wide range of salts. Apart from their acid-neutralization function, salts may 
themselves contribute to the effectiveness of the drug depending on their composition. A salt may 
even constitute an improved modification of its parent acid in terms of therapeutic efficacy. Since 
the various salts tracing back to the same acid may have different properties, inventors in the 
pharmaceutical sector should identify the optimal salt(s) to determine the most suitable form(s) of a 
drug. When the suggested treatment involves intravenous chemotherapy, the salt’s degree of 
solubility is obviously of crucial importance. 
By replacing two acidic hydrogen units with sodium counterparts, Eli Lilly was able to obtain an acid 
salt called pemetrexed disodium in solid form. This is a neutrally charged ionic compound because it 
contains an equal number of positively charged ions (cations) and negatively charged ions (anions). 
Once the salt is thrown into water the positively charged sodium cations will flee, separating 
themselves from the pemetrexed anions. Those anions constitute the therapeutic ingredients of 
pemetrexed disodium. Despite the neutralization reaction, some of the toxic side effects of 
pemetrexed persisted. Meanwhile, Eli Lilly discovered that a combination therapy that would include 
the administration of vitamin B12 would drastically reduce those side effects. Claim 1 of the patent 
granted reads: “Use of pemetrexed in the manufacture of a medicament for use in combination 
therapy for inhibiting tumour growth in mammals wherein said medicament is to be administered in 
combination with vitamin B12 or a pharmaceutical derivative thereof.” 
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Actavis sought to capitalise upon Eli Lilly’s discovery of the combined effect produced by the 
simultaneous administration of pemetrexed and vitamin B12 while avoiding infringing the earlier 
patent. To achieve that aim, it marketed products that either combined the free acid form 
pemetrexed with vitamin B12 or relied on an alternative salt such as pemetrexed dipotassium. 
All the aforementioned examples raise issues of patent scope. The relevant legal rule is s. 125(1) 
Patents Act 1977, which corresponds to Article 69 of the EPC 2000 (ex Article 69 of the EPC 1973). 
Pursuant to this provision, the extent to which an invention is protected through the patent 
instrument shall be “taken to be that specified in a claim of the specification of the application or 
patent, as the case may be, as interpreted by the description and any drawings contained in that 
specification.” As s. 125(3) PA 1977 further stipulates, the interpretation of s. 125(1) PA 1977 must 
be in accordance with the guidelines set out in the Protocol on the Interpretation of Article 69 of the 
EPC. 
The Protocol excludes extreme interpretations that would give excessive prominence to the value of 
legal certainty over the interest of protecting inventions to induce innovation and vice versa. It 
rejects out of hand the notion of a strict literal interpretation whereby the description and the 
drawings would only be consulted for the purpose of resolving any ambiguity found in the claims. 
Equally, the opposite extreme must be avoided. Patent scope may not be exclusively determined 
through an extrapolation of the patentee’s inventive concept as it could be deducted from a 
conjunctive reading of all information contained in the specification document as a whole in an 
attempt to appreciate what the patentee had in fact contemplated. The Protocol itself describes the 
proper approach to the interpretation of patent claims in Article 1 as a balancing exercise in search 
of a position between two extremes “which combines a fair protection for the patentee with a 
reasonable degree of certainty for third parties.” Article 2 of the Protocol provides that courts 
assessing the scope of patents should take due account of “any element which is equivalent to an 
element specified in the claims.” 
The patent bargain as a relational contract 
From the perspective of the patent bargain theory, the patent grant is perceived as the result of a 
contract between the inventor and the state.10 The state grants a temporally limited right of 
exclusivity in exchange for the efficient disclosure of an invention that is new, non-obvious and 
useful. Just as social contract theory has been relied upon to justify the authority of the state over 
the individual,11 the bargain theory of patents dissociated the foundations of the patent system from 
the notion of a monarchical monopoly grant and offered a justification centred around the public’s 
consent.12 It may also explain the nature and the function of patentability requirements such as 
novelty and non-obviousness,13 which determine whether the consideration offered by the applicant 
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judges, but as a bargain with the public.”]. See also W. Carpmael, The Law of Patents for Inventions, Familiarly 
Explained, for the Use of Inventors and Patentees s (London: G. Wightman, 1832) p.1: “[Crown grants of 
patents] must be restricted within the bounds of the common law.” 
13 Actavis Group PTC EHF v ICOS Corporation [2019] Bus. L.R. 1318 SC at 1333-1334, per Lord Hodge; cf 
Pennock et al. v. Dialogue 27 US 1, 23 (1829)  per Justice Story: “If the public were already in possession and 
common use of an invention fairly and without fraud, there might be sound reason for presuming, that the 
legislature did not intend to grant an exclusive right to any one to monopolize that which was already 
common. There would be no quid pro quo—no price for the exclusive right or monopoly conferred upon the 
is adequate.14 A key feature of the bargain theory is that it had historically provided crucial support 
for the patent system at times when incentive theories were not very persuasive and debaters 
argued that the lure of an exclusive right is not really necessary to induce innovation.15 Patents may 
not be indispensable, according to that argument, for spurring innovation but are nonetheless 
necessary as they do provide incentives for disclosure of inventions that would have otherwise 
remained secret.16 Although the invention-inducement theory and the disclosure theory are 
conceptually independent of one another,17 both rationales underpinning patent protection 
constitute complementary justifications18 for the patent system and may well be accommodated 
under a holistic contract theory of patents.19 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
inventor [...].”; Bonito Boats, Inc. v. Thunder Craft Boats, Inc. 489 US 141, 161 (1989) (noting that the federal 
patent statute has conditioned the grant of a patent on “the quid pro quo of substantial creative effort”). cf 
W.M. Hindmarch, A Treatise on the Law Relative to Patent Privileges for the Sole Use of Inventors and 
Patentees (Harrisburg, PA: I.G. M'Kinley and J.M.G. Lescure, printers, 1847) p.71. 
14 Courts are not supposed to assess the adequacy of consideration as they normally are in no better position 
to assess the reasonableness of contractual terms than the parties themselves. Any asymmetry between the 
value of a promise and the consideration rendered by the other party would potentially be relevant as 
circumstantial evidence for the existence of some legitimate ground to set aside the underlying contract, R. 
Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (New York: Wolters Kluwer Law & Business, 9th edn, 2014) pp 102-05 
(exploring the various economic functions of the consideration requirement). From a law and economics 
perspective, however, the magnitude of consideration correlates with the efficiency of resource allocation, C. 
Veljanovski, Economic Principles of Law (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2007) p 137. Unless the state’s 
promise to grant and enforce exclusive rights in inventions is supported by adequate consideration, patents 
would give rise to socially undesirable monopolies. Courts often accentuate the principle that the scope of a 
patent should be commensurate to the patentee’s inventive contribution. See for instance,  Actavis Group 
[2019] UKSC 15 at [57] per Lord Hodge: “The general principle that the extent of the patent monopoly should 
correspond to and be justified by the actual technical contribution to the art is thus part of the jurisprudence 
of both the EPO and the UK courts and, as Lord Sumption observed in Generics v Warner-Lambert […] “the 
principal conditions of validity, novelty, inventive step, industrial application and sufficiency are all, in one way 
or another, directed to satisfying the principle thus expressed”. There is therefore a balance or symmetry in 
patent law […].” Thus, the doctrine of consideration serves the key function of guaranteeing that patents are 
justifiably granted. Importantly, it also bars, as a matter of contemporary positive law, the emergence of an 
enforceable promise of the state to arbitrarily award monopolies through the issuance of prerogative patents 
like monarchs used to do back in the old days. See E.A. Posner, “Economic analysis of contract law after three 
decades: success or failure?” (2003) 112 Yale LJ 829 at 850 (noting that one of the main functions of the 
consideration doctrine “is now to deny enforcement of promises to give gifts.”). cf  W.M. Hindmarch, A 
Treatise on the Law Relative to Patent Privileges (1847) p.64. See also D. Vaver, “Intellectual property: still a 
"bargain"?” (2012) 34 EIPR 579 (accepting that the “bargain metaphor” is helpful in ensuring that there is a 
proper balance between individual and collective interests but arguing that the IP system favours rights 
holders). 
15 M. Fisher, Fundamentals of Patent Law: Interpretation and Scope of Protection (Oxford: Hart Publishing, 
2007) pp 81-85. 
16 It is perhaps for this reason that the bargain theory is quite often juxtaposed to reward and incentive 
theories as showing just cause for the patent system on the grounds of technical disclosure. See for instance, 
Vincenzo V. Denicolò and L.A. Franzoni, “The contract theory of patents” (2004) 23 IRLE 365 (developing an 
insightful economic model and suggesting that the information function of patents constitutes a self-contained 
and sufficient justification for the grant of patent protection). 
17 F. Machlup, “An economic review of the patent system” Study of the Subcommittee on Patents, Trademarks, 
and Copyrights of the Committee on the Judiciary, U.S. Senate, study no. 15 (Washington: United States 
Government Printing Office, 1958) p 24. 
18 Asahi Kasei Kogyo KK's Application [1991] RPC 485 at 523, per Lord Oliver: “The underlying purpose of the 
patent system is the encouragement of improvements and innovation. In return for making known his 
improvement to the public the inventor receives the benefit of a period of monopoly during which he becomes 
entitled to prevent others from performing his invention except by his licence.” cf Kewanee Oil Co. v. Bicron 
Corp. 416 US 470, 480 (1974), per Chief Justice Burger: “The patent laws promote [the] progress [of science 
This analysis will further illustrate that point by drawing upon the specific incentive structures 
created by contracts inducing the parties to act in reliance of an enforceable promise. In particular, 
credible commitments to enforce contractual promises generate incentives for individuals to engage 
in relationship-specific investments.20 Think of an automobile manufacturer, for instance, who 
wishes to outsource the production of some car part to a third party. Let’s assume further that this 
mechanical part has to be tailored to its needs and therefore it would only optimally interact with its 
own engine system. On the other hand, the parts manufacturer would have to specialize on a given 
type of machinery foregoing other contractual opportunities or even perhaps losing some of its 
current customers. Such investments lose their value, partially or completely, outside the context of 
a commercial relationship. No third party would match the price the automobile manufacturer is 
willing to pay for the customized car part. Normally, the parts manufacturer would require a long-
term contact guaranteeing certain output levels at a profitable price to consider incurring 
relationship-specific investments.21  
Several features of the patent system militate in favour of the proposition that the patent bargain 
should be viewed as a relational contract. Inventors have an incentive to promptly disclose their 
innovations to the Intellectual Property Office rather than keeping them secret as in the latter case 
they would not be able to enjoin the use of their inventive ideas by those who will at some point 
become able to develop them independently.22 Rules excluding particular categories of subject 
matter from patent protection are designed to induce some abstractly prescribed human 
intervention with the state of things by means of a technical contribution to the art.23 No patent will 
be granted for discovering a naturally occurring substance, for instance, since discoveries themselves 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
and useful arts] by offering a right of exclusion for a limited period as an incentive to inventors to risk the often 
enormous costs in terms of time, research, and development. The productive effort thereby fostered will have 
a positive effect on society through the introduction of new products and processes of manufacture into the 
economy, and the emanations by way of increased employment and better lives for our citizens. In return for 
the right of exclusion -this "reward for inventions" […]- the patent laws impose upon the inventor a 
requirement of disclosure.” 
19 cf Actavis Group [2019] Bus. L.R. 1318 SC at 1333, per Lord Hodge: “[T]he purpose of a grant of a patent has 
been to encourage innovation. The monopoly granted by the patent rewards the inventor by enabling him or 
her to charge a higher price than would have been possible if there had been competition. The “patent 
bargain” is this: the inventor obtains a monopoly in return for disclosing the invention and dedicating it to the 
public for use after the monopoly has expired.”; Teva Canada Ltd v Pfizer Canada Inc [2013] 4 LRC 218 at 227: 
“The patent system is based on a 'bargain', or quid pro quo: the inventor is granted exclusive rights in a new 
and useful invention for a limited period in exchange for disclosure of the invention so that society can benefit 
from this knowledge. This is the basic policy rationale underlying the Act. The patent bargain encourages 
innovation and advances science and technology.” (emphasis added). cf M. Coulter, Property in Ideas – The 
Patent Question in Mid-Victorian Britain (Kirksville, Missouri: Thomas Jefferson University Press, 1991) p.94 
(noting how the proponents of patent protection had relied on the bargain theory to corroborate arguments 
pertaining to incentives to invent and disclose). 
20 R. Craswell, “Two economic theories of enforcing promises” in P. Benson (ed.), The Theory of Contract Law: 
New Essays (New York: Cambridge University Press, 2001) pp.28-30. 
21 I.R. Macneil, “Contracts: Adjustment of long-term economic relations under classical, neoclassical, and 
relational contract law” (1977-1978) 72 Nw. U. L. Rev. 854, 886 et seq. 
22 The bargain between the inventor and the state does not coerce but rather encourages disclosure. cf 
Kewanee Oil 416 US 470, 484 (1974), per Chief Justice Burger: “The more difficult objective of the patent law 
to reconcile with trade secret law is that of disclosure, the quid pro quo of the right to exclude.” (ruling 
eventually that federal patent law does not pre-empt state trade secret law). 
23 Aerotel Ltd v Telco Holdings; Re Macrossan’s Application [2007] R.P.C. 117 CA (Civ Div) at 134–135; Symbian 
Ltd v Comptroller-General of Patents [2009] R.P.C. 1 CA (Civ Div) at 7–9; T-208/84 Computer-related 
invention/VIACOM [1987] OJ EPO 14 at 16. 
do not constitute protectable subject matter.24 Those, however, who have been able to isolate a 
natural substance from its surroundings may patent that substance as well as its isolation method 
provided that other requirements for patentability are met.25 This is a strong incentive for inventors 
to make available inputs that are essential to medicinal or other industrial productions. By excluding 
only some types of inventions patent law manages to steer innovative efforts within a broader field 
of activity envisaging an optimal trade-off between the social costs and the social benefits associated 
with the grant of an exclusive right. Medical methods are not patentable, for instance, but 
substances intended for use in such methods are. Occasionally, the invention of a new 
pharmaceutical compound may coincide with an innovative treatment method, which could then be 
practised freely.26 
Inventions are patentable as long as they are new, involve an inventive step, and are capable of 
industrial application. The novelty requirement can be quite harsh. If there has been a single 
opportunity for the invention to be inspected by a person skilled in the art who could appreciate the 
details of the invention while not being under any obligation of confidentiality, the novelty of the 
respective patent application is destroyed.27 Ultimately, the patent system strives to induce the 
expeditious disclosure of inventive ideas through patent applications. Grave emphasis is placed on 
the celerity of the patent disclosure, which is crucial not only for the efficient dissemination and 
commercialization of technology but also for the progress of science.28 Moreover, the requirement 
of absolute novelty highlights that no patent incentive is provided for simply importing technology 
from abroad.29 Regardless of where in the world it has been made available, already existing 
information about the invention would anticipate the inventor’s application.30 
With regard to the requirement of an inventive step, it is a manifestation of the principle that the 
patent instrument is not there to induce the disclosure of inventions that are somehow supposed to 
have emerged anyway as a result of the efforts undertaken by a person ordinarily skilled in the art 
who would combine pieces of relevant prior knowledge to solve a given technical problem.31 
Instead, the prospect of patent rights functions as an incentive to bring forward inventions that may 
indeed occur in the natural course of events but at a much later stage. Assessing whether an 
invention entails an inventive step is a complex question which requires the consideration of various 
                                                          
24 PA 1977, s.1(2)(a); EPC, art.52(2)(a). 
25 Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the Council of 6 July 1998 on the legal protection of 
biotechnological inventions OJ 1998 L213/13 pp.13–21, [hereinafter Biotech Directive], Art 5(2); PA 1977, 
Sch.A2, para.2; Howard Florey/Relaxin [1995] EPOR 541. 
26 cf Kirin-Amgen [2005] RPC 169 at 196, per Lord Hoffmann: “An invention is a practical product or process, 
not information about the natural world. That seems to me to accord with the social contract between the 
state and the inventor which underlies patent law. The state gives the inventor a monopoly in return for an 
immediate disclosure of all the information necessary to enable performance of the invention. That disclosure 
is not only to enable other people to perform the invention after the patent has expired. If that were all, the 
inventor might as well be allowed to keep it secret during the life of the patent. It is also to enable anyone to 
make immediate use of the information for any purpose which does not infringe the claims.” 
27 Lux Traffic Controls Ltd v. Pike Signals Ltd and Faronwise Ltd [1993] RPC 107 at 133, per Aldous J. 
28 Kirin-Amgen [2005] RPC 169 at 196, per Lord Hoffmann. 
29 Notably, the nature of the consideration may change over time. Consider Edward Darcy Esquire v Thomas 
Allin of London Haberdasher (1599) Noy 173, 74 E.R. 1131 at 1139. See also Singer Mfg. Co. v. June Mfg. Co. 
163 U.S. 169 (1896).  
30 PA 1977, s.2(2); EPC, art.54(2). 
31 Windsurfing International Inc. v. Tabur Marine (G.B.) Ltd [1985] RPC 59 at 77, per Oliver LJ: “No doubt, the 
philosophy behind [obviousness must take into account] that it would be wrong to prevent a man from doing 
something which is merely an obvious extension of what he has been doing or of what was known in the art 
before the priority date of the patent granted.” 
factors without yielding to some rigid formula.32 Research and development efforts based on 
promising research avenues with a reasonable expectation of success are rather unlikely to 
culminate in the procurement of a patent, for instance.33 
Patent protection is only available for inventions that are capable of industrial application.34 Courts 
and competent authorities have interpreted this requirement broadly to include anything that could 
possibly be made or used in industry.35 A patentable invention must offer to the public some 
“concrete benefit.”36 Claims directed at a DNA-sequence expressing a novel protein, for instance, 
would not be patentable unless there is an indication in the application about the therapeutic 
virtues of the claimed invention.37 Notably, the law refrains from dictating the types of socially 
desirable innovations. In a system where there is no state compensation for rewarding inventive 
activity but innovation is spurred by patent rights ensuring that patentees will capture the full 
market value of their inventions, it is for the inventors to figure out themselves what sort of 
utilitarian value may be demanded by the public. In that regard, it could be argued that the patent 
bargain features a certain degree of strategic incompleteness.38 Furthermore, the utilitarian benefit 
associated with the invention does not need to be positively proven. It would suffice to plausibly 
establish that the novel protein just discovered could be put to some therapeutic use by highlighting, 
for instance, its structural analogies to other proteins known for their pharmaceutical applications.39 
Inventors are thereby incentivized to disclose their inventive ideas at the very moment they reach a 
sufficient stage of maturity so that they could be characterized as mere speculations without being 
required to adduce empirical data based on some in vitro or in vivo study. It ensues therefrom that 
the general policy favouring the unhesitating disclosure of inventions underlies the administration of 
the industrial applicability requirement as well.40 
The efficiency of the patent disclosure depends not only on its promptness but also on its quality. 
Hence, requirements such as those of sufficiency41 as well as claim clarity, support and confinement 
to a single invention/inventive concept42 essentially specify the consideration applicants are required 
to render.43 Under a contractarian view of the patent system, the contract between the inventor and 
the state is meant to induce reliance investments by individuals through abstract provisions that are 
capable of channeling inventive efforts towards the achievement of socially desirable innovations.44 
                                                          
32 Generics (UK) Ltd v Daiichi Pharmaceutical Co Ltd [2009] RPC 828 at 837, per Jacob LJ. 
33 Conor Medsystems Inc v Angiotech Pharmaceuticals Inc [2008] RPC 716 at 730, per Lord Hoffmann. 
34 PA 1977, ss.1(1)(c) and 4(1); EPC, arts.52(1) and 57. 
35 Chiron Corporation v Murex Diagnostics Ltd and Organon Teknika Ltd [1996] RPC 535 at 607, per Morritt LJ.  
36 T 0898/05 Hematopoietic receptor/ZYMOGENETICS [2007] EPOR 2 at [r 2]-[r 6]. 
37 Biotech Directive, Art 5(3); Patents Act 1977, Sch.A2, para 6. 
38 On this point see J. Tirole, “Incomplete Contracts: Where Do We Stand?” (1999) 67 ECMA 741 at 742. 
39 Eli Lilly and Co v Human Genome Sciences Inc [2012] 1 All ER 1154 SC at 1181-84, per Lord Neuberger  
(reviewing the principles established by the EPO Technical Boards of Appeal). 
40 Eli Lilly and Co, [2012] 1 All ER 1154 at 1187-88, per Lord Neuberger. 
41 PA 1977, ss.14(3) and 72(1)(c); EPC, art.83. 
42 PA 1977, s.14(5)(c); EPC, art.84. 
43 See generally M. Fisher, “Extracting the price of a patent: enablement and written description” [2012] IPQ 
262; Warner-Lambert Co LLC v Generics (UK) Ltd (t/a Mylan) [2019] 3 All ER 95 SC at 105-106, per Lord 
Sumption; cf Universal Oil Products Co. v. Globe Oil & Refining Co. 322 US 471, 484 (1944), per Justice Reed: 
“But the quid pro quo is disclosure of a process or device in sufficient detail to enable one skilled in the art to 
practice the invention once the period of the monopoly has expired […].” 
44 cf  Brenner v. Manson  383 US 519, 534-35 (1966), per Justice Fortas: “The basic quid pro quo contemplated 
by the Constitution and the Congress for granting a patent monopoly is the benefit derived by the public from 
an invention with substantial utility. Unless and until a process is refined and developed to this point—where 
The problem of opportunism 
Where the parties have entered a contract but were not able to stipulate provisions for all possible 
future contingencies, the party that has incurred relation-specific investments might find itself in a 
vulnerable position at some renegotiation stage, particularly if specialization has reduced or 
eradicated its outside options. Contractual incompleteness is associated with the problem of 
underinvestment. The prospect of opportunistic behaviour during the renegotiation stage reduces 
incentives to invest. 
There are basically two suggested solutions to this problem. The first solution, which is derived from 
the insights of transaction cost economics, seeks to promote the conclusion of complete contracts. 
Parties are expected to provide for revelation mechanisms that cover all possible contingencies 
including the mutual exchange or the surrendering of economic “hostages”, such as posting a bond, 
to quell their anxieties about entering into an agreement and living in dread of being exposed to 
opportunism.45 Contract law seeks to remedy “incompleteness errors” through recourse to default 
rules in order to reconstruct the complete contract.46 The second solution relies on property rights 
to avoid the problem of underinvestment.47 A typical example is the R&D game. Normally, courts 
cannot verify whether the agent has complied with its obligation under the contract to use its best 
efforts to create some new technology. In the case of “observable but non-verifiable” contractual 
variables, the agent is exposed to the opportunistic behaviour of the principal who might seek to 
renegotiate the price arguing that the research and development efforts were lax. There is also the 
possibility of a court or a jury mistakenly assuming that the agent did not observe the “best efforts” 
clause. Allocating the patent rights to the agent reduces the reservations of R&D firms to enter into 
such contracts.48 In contrast to the transaction cost theory, the property rights approach is based on 
the premise that complete contracting is unattainable. Although they are based on different 
assumptions, both approaches share the notion that contractual safeguards are necessary for 
dealing with the problem of opportunism.49 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
specific benefit exists in currently available form—there is insufficient justification for permitting an applicant 
to engross what may prove to be a broad field.” J.E.M. Ag Supply, Inc. v. Pioneer Hi-Bred Intern., Inc. 534 U.S. 
124, 142 (2001), per Justice Thomas: “The disclosure required by the Patent Act is the quid pro quo of the right 
to exclude.” (emphasis added). 
45 O.E. Williamson, The Mechanisms of Governance (New York: Oxford University Press, 1996) pp 120 et seq. 
Integration would be another option for two transacting parties wishing to eradicate the prospect of falling 
victim to opportunism apart from achieving other efficiencies such as the reduction of transaction costs. See 
also O.E. Williamson, Markets and Hierarchies: Analysis and Antitrust Implications (New York: The Free Press, 
1975) pp 29-40 and 253-58 (summarizing his theory). 
46 Veljanovski, Economic Principles of Law (2007) pp 121-25; C.J. Goetz and R.E. Scott, “The limits of expanded 
choice: An analysis of the interactions between express and implied contract terms” (1985) 73 Calif. L. Rev. 
261, 270-71. 
47 S.J. Grossmann and O.D. Hart, “The costs and benefits of ownership: A theory of vertical and lateral 
integration” (1986) 94 J Pol Econ 691; O. Hart and J. Moore, “Property rights and the nature of the firm” (1990) 
98 J Pol Econ 1119. For a concise introduction see O. Hart, Firms, Contracts and Financial Structure (New York: 
Oxford University Press, 1995) pp.1-12 and 29-33. 
48 See generally, Tirole, “Incomplete Contracts” (1999) 67 ECMA 741. 
49 For a juxtaposition of those theories, a critical appraisal of their core assumptions and further bibliographical 
references see E. Brousseau and J-M. Glachant, “The economics of contracts and the renewal of economics” in 
E. Brousseau and J-M. Glachant (eds), The Economics of Contracts: Theories and Applications (New York: 
Cambridge University Press, 2002) pp 3-30. Importantly, these observations apply to public-state partnerships 
where residual rights of control might be reserved for the state, Hart, O “Incomplete contracts and public 
ownership: Remarks, and an application to public-private partnerships” (2003) 113 EJ p C69. Hence, the 
contractarian view of the patent grant may indeed explain review proceedings of administrative nature. cf 
But without a workable definition of opportunism, those principles cannot be fructified. At a very 
abstract level, opportunism could be defined as an attempt to promote self-interest in a manner 
that is socially undesirable.50 Such an over-inclusive definition could only be avoided if the 
circumstances actually warranting legal intervention are more clearly defined. In a contractual 
setting, opportunism could be perceived as conduct that falls short of violating any literal terms but 
which evidently contradicts the reasonable expectations of the other party under the contract.51 
Refining the definition further, an opportunist seeks to obtain a benefit which contractual 
stipulations seem to have left free for acquisition when the reason for that benefit not having been 
contracted away in the first place lies in the impossibility to cost-efficiently define and deter 
opportunistic behaviour ex ante through appropriate contract terms.52 Importantly, this definition is 
capable of capturing instances where opportunism may easily take on the guise of perfectly 
legitimate conduct (“subtle opportunism”).53 Legal safeguards operate ex post through the 
administration of rules or standards that rely on proxies associated with opportunism. Patentees 
face an analogous problem when the state fails to protect them against the appropriation of their 
inventive concepts by parties that are capable of circumventing the wording of the claims. 
Contract interpretation: Textualism v contextualism 
Textualism reflects the notion that complete contracting is both feasible and desirable.54 A strict 
literal approach to interpretation would foster better contracting by motivating the parties to 
correctly perceive the meaning of words and use them accurately for determining the content of 
complete contracts. Accordingly, textualism neither favours inquiries upon whether there are terms 
that should be deemed as implied nor tends to excessively rely on default rules. Textualist 
approaches to interpretation or recognition of implied terms would only work, however, when it is 
indeed cost-efficient for the parties to make provision for all possible contingencies. If transaction 
costs are high and/or the ability of the parties to design complete contracts is limited, textualism will 
inevitably allow opportunism to flourish. 
Under the contextual approach, on the other hand, courts are not only required to ascertain the 
objective meaning of the language used by the parties to express their agreement but they are also 
expected to look at the contract as a whole and consider elements arising from the wider 
contractual context to achieve that aim.55 Contextualism is rooted in the idea that contracts would 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
Ghosh, S “Patents and the regulatory state: Rethinking the patent bargain metaphor after Eldred” (2004) 19 
Berkeley Tech LJ 1315 (rejecting the normative value of the theory and criticising it, among others, for not 
being able to explain the administrative law dimension of patent law). 
50 See e.g. O.E. Williamson, The Economic Institutions of Capitalism (New York: The Free Press, 1987) p.47 
(defining opportunism as “self-interest seeking with guile”). 
51 G.M. Cohen, “The negligence-opportunism trade-off in contract law” (1992) 20 Hofstra L. Rev. 941 at 957; cf 
V.P. Goldberg, “Relational exchange: Economics and complex contracts” (1980) 23 Am. Behav. Sci. 337 at 339 
and Posner, Economic Analysis of Law (2014) p 97 (both associating opportunism with the exploitation of the 
other party’s vulnerabilities). 
52 H.E. Smith, “Equity as second-order law: The problem of opportunism” (2015) Harvard Public Law Working 
Paper No. 15-13 available at https://ssrn.com/abstract=2617413 at 14. Opportunistic behaviour tends to 
redistribute “portions of an already allocated contractual pie”, C.J. Goetz and R.E. Scott, “Principles of 
relational contracts” (1981) 67 Va. L. Rev. 1089 at 1139. 
53 On the concept of “subtle opportunism” see T.J. Muris “Opportunistic behaviour and the law of contracts” 
(1981) 65 Minn L Rev 521 at 525. 
54 G.K. Hadfiled, “Judicial competence and the interpretation of incomplete contracts” (1994) 23 J. Legal Stud. 
159 at 161.  
55 Investors Compensation Scheme Ltd v West Bromwich Building Society [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 912 per Lord 
Hoffmann (“Interpretation is the ascertainment of the meaning which the document would convey to a 
often be incomplete not only because of the parties’ failure to provide for a given contingency but 
also due to the vagueness of their express terms. Still, the point of departure remains the natural 
and ordinary meaning of the contested clause which within the framework an iterative process of 
interpretation might give way to some alternative interpretation emerging from the content of the 
contract or the surrounding circumstances.56 
In practice, courts eventually end up balancing indications derived from both textual and contextual 
argumentations.57 Textual analysis would normally dominate the interpretative inquiry in the case of 
complex and sophisticated agreements which are usually negotiated and drafted with the assistance 
of skilled professionals.58 On the other side of the spectrum, greater emphasis would be placed on 
the factual background when less formal agreements are being interpreted.59 Recourse to the 
factual matrix60 would be imperative to the interpretation of complex formal agreements that are 
vitiated by vagueness. Inconsistency between the several terms assorted in a single agreement is 
likely to arise when the final text adopted reflects a compromise between parties that have 
conflicting aims.61 Various other factors such as the parties’ adherence to different drafting 
practices, communication failures between them and pressing deadlines to reach an agreement, 
may be instrumental in the eventual failure to adopt an unambiguous text.62 
The contextual approach to contractual interpretation requires a significant degree of inquisition. 
Courts should be mindful, for instance, that it would have been impossible for the parties to ex ante 
design more precise contractual terms. Business common sense could inform the assessment by 
highlighting the commercial consequences of rival interpretations.63 To live up to the challenge of 
interpreting vague terms the courts might look at the meaning the parties themselves have ascribed 
to specific terms in their prior dealings or consider how similar provisions in contracts of the same 
type are perceived within the relevant business sector.64 
At any rate, the language used by the parties may not be disregarded. The purpose of contractual 
interpretation is to ascertain what the parties have agreed upon from the perspective of a 
                                                                                                                                                                                    
reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would reasonably have been available to the 
parties in the situation in which they were at the time of the contract.”). 
56 Arnold v Britton [2015] AC 1619 SC at 1627, per Lord Neuberger (noting that the disputed clause had to be 
assessed in light of (i) [its] natural and ordinary meaning, (ii) any other relevant provisions of the contract, (iii) 
[its] overall purpose [as well as the broader purpose of the contract]” (iv) the facts and circumstances known 
or assumed by the parties at the time that the document was executed, and (v) commercial common sense, 
but (vi) disregarding subjective evidence of any party's intentions.”). See also Lord Grabiner, “The iterative 
process of contractual interpretation” [2012] 128 LQR 41. 
57 Wood v Capita Insurance Services Ltd [2017] AC SC 1173  at 1180, per Lord Hodge. In that case, the Supreme 
Court effectively summarized and expanded upon the principles established through its earlier decisions on 
contact interpretation. 
58 Wood [2017] AC 1173 at 1180, per Lord Hodge. 
59 Wood [2017] AC 1173 at 1180, per Lord Hodge. 
60 The term was coined in Prenn v Simmonds [1971] 1 WLR 1381 at 1384, per Lord Wilberforce. The factual 
background comprises all information that could have affected the way the document would have been 
understood by a reasonable person, Investors Compensation Scheme, [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 921 per Lord 
Hoffmann. There is no conceptual limit as to what may be included in the factual background, Bank of Credit 
and Commerce International SA v Ali [2002] 1 AC 251 at 269 per Lord Hoffmann. 
61 Wood [2017] AC 1173 at 1180, per Lord Hodge. 
62 Wood [2017] AC 1173 at 1180, per Lord Hodge. 
63 Rainy Sky S. A. v Kookmin Bank [2011] 1 WLR 2900 SC at 2908, per Lord Clarke. 
64 Wood [2017] AC 1173 at 1180,. See also C. Staughton, “How do the courts interpret commercial contracts?” 
[1999] 58 CLJ 303 at 311-12. For some examples derived from case law see K. Lewison, The Interpretation of 
Contracts (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 6th edn, 2015) at 5.09. 
reasonable business person and not to re-write contracts in light of business common sense with a 
view to coming to the aid of someone who has slipped into a bad deal.65 Evidence might 
nevertheless suggest that the parties had used words of common vocabulary in an unconventional 
sense creating their own “private dictionary.”66 Apart from its primary meaning, the word elephant, 
for instance, may mean a hand-carved object in the shape of an elephant or it may even mean 
“horse” if there is an understanding or a common assumption between the parties that it actually 
does so.67 Importantly, it is not necessary to establish that the crucial term is ambiguous before 
ascertaining its contextual meaning.68  
While a broad evidentiary basis is necessary for ascertaining the parties’ intention, limits must be 
drawn as to the admissible background otherwise contractual interpretation might turn out to be 
overly costly.69 Hence, the law excludes the parties’ previous negotiations and declarations of 
subjective intent from the pool of information that forms the factual matrix in light of which 
contracts are to be interpreted.70 
Contextualism provides incentives for better contracting since it induces the parties to familiarize 
themselves with the language usage as well as with the customary practices pervading the 
conclusion of bargains in the field of their economic activity.71 By doing so, negotiating parties would 
also economize on transaction costs. Over and above that, the contextual approach is more 
permissive towards the implication of contractual terms by courts seeking to ascertain the contents 
of contracts exactly because it calls for a thorough consideration of the factual matrix. Another 
advantage of contextualism is that it provides the courts with an analytical tool enabling them to 
ensure that no intention is attributed to the parties which they could not possibly have had due to 
some unfortunate contractual stipulation.72  
                                                          
65 Arnold v Britton [2015] AC 1619 SC at 1628-2169 per Lord Neuberger; Chartbrook Ltd v Persimmon Homes 
Ltd [2009] AC 1101 SC at 1114, per Lord Hoffmann (“All that is required is that it should be clear that 
something has gone wrong with the language and that it should be clear what a reasonable person would have 
understood the parties to have meant.”). Investors Compensation Scheme [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 913, per Lord 
Hoffmann; N. Andrews, “Interpretation of contracts and “commercial common sense”: Do not overplay this 
useful criterion” [2017] 76 CLJ 36. 
66 Chartbrook [2009] AC 1101 HL at 1122, per Lord Hoffmann; Charter Reinsurance Co Ltd v Fagan [1997] A.C. 
313 at 391-92, per Lord Hoffmann (highlighting the various possible contextual meanings of the word “pay”). 
For additional illustrative examples from case law see K. Lewison, The Interpretation of Contracts (2015) at 
5.10. 
67 D. McLauchlan, “Some fallacies concerning the law of contract interpretation” [2017] LMCLQ 506, 518. On 
the contextual dependency of interpretation see generally Lord Hoffmann, ‘The intolerable wrestle with words 
and meanings’ [1997] 114 SALJ 656 and D. Nicholls, “My kingdom for a horse: The meaning of words” [2005] 
121 LQR 577. 
68 Regina (Westminster City Council) v National Asylum Support Service [2002] 1 WLR 2956 at 2959, per Lord 
Steyn. See also E. McKendrick, “The interpretation of contracts: Lord Hoffmann’s Re-Statement” in S. 
Worthington (ed), Commercial Law and Commercial Practice (Oregon: Hart Publishing, 2003) p 138 at 157-58; 
R. Buxton, “’Construction’ and rectification after Chartbrook” [2010] 69 CLJ 253 at 256. 
69 The exercise of the judiciary’s case management powers ensures that adjudication costs will not go out of 
proportion, G. McMeel, McMeel on the Construction of Contracts: Interpretation, Implication, Rectification 
(New York: Oxford University Press, 3rd edn, 2017) at 5.47. 
70 Investors Compensation Scheme [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 913 per Lord Hoffmann; Chartbrook, [2009] AC 1101 at 
1120-21, per Lord Hoffmann.  
71 See, for instance, British Sugar plc v NEI Power Projects Ltd (1997) 87 BLW CA (Civ Div) 45 at 50 per Lord 
Justice Waller (holding that “a reasonable businessman must more naturally be taken to be having the 
intention that the phrase should bear the same meaning as [in earlier analogous cases]. It would again take 
very clear words to allow a court to construe the phrase differently”). 
72 Antaios Compania Naviera SA v Salen Rederierna AB (The Antaios) [1985] AC 191 HL at 201, per Lord Diplock. 
The contextual approach is better suited for protecting parties “whose investments are vulnerable to 
changes in contractual interpretation.”73 Therefore, contextualism is a preferable method for 
interpreting patent claims. 
Default rules 
Default rules seek to remedy the defects of contractual incompleteness by filling gaps in contracts. 
One of their functions is to determine the efficient terms, those that the parties would have 
contracted for in the absence of transaction costs with a view to maximizing their joint utility.74 Gap-
filling is normally justified when drafting is very expensive due to high transaction costs, the inability 
of the parties to foresee future contingencies and/or any inevitable limitation of language.75 
In other instances, it would make sense to choose default rules that are most likely to be eventually 
contracted around in order to force parties to avoid incompleteness either by explicitly providing for 
a given contingency or by revealing information.76 A default rule setting the quantity of goods to be 
delivered at zero, for instance, would induce the parties to a sales contract to specify the amount of 
the contracted goods. Buyers facing large losses in the event of non-performance, to refer to 
another example, would be motivated by a default remedy for breach of contract providing for only 
a small payment to negotiate an explicit contractual term that would cover all of their potential 
losses revealing thereby the potential magnitude of their consequential damages. 
Purposive interpretation: the traditional British approach to patent claim 
construction77 
From early on, British courts have always sought to shield patentees against the opportunistic 
attempts of third parties to highjack the inventive concept revealed in letters patent by marketing 
products or practising processes that fall outside the conventional meaning of the wording used to 
describe the patented invention. Findings of patent infringement were not confined to the 
straightforward case where one reproduces verbatim or punctiliously practises the claimed subject 
matter. Reiterating earlier case law, the House of Lords noted in Clark v Adie, that patent property 
may well be trespassed upon by someone, for instance, who has offered for sale a product 
resembling a patented machine only in some respects but which nonetheless implemented and 
                                                          
73 A.W. Katz, “The economics of form and substance in contract interpretation” (2004) 104 Colum L Rev 496, 
530. 
74 R.A. Posner, “The law and economics of contract interpretation” (2005) 83 Tex. L. Rev. 1581, 1588 (noting 
that gap-filling rules driven by efficiency considerations would tend to mirror the terms the parties would have 
wanted if they were able to conclude a complete a contract). 
75 A. Schwartz, “Relational contracts in the courts: An analysis of incomplete agreements and judicial 
strategies” (1992) 21 J. Legal Stud. 271, 281-83. 
76 I. Ayres and R. Gertner, “Filling gaps in incomplete contracts: An economic theory of default rules” (1989) 99 
Yale LJ 87 (elaborating upon Hadley v Baxendale 9 Ex. 341, 156 Eng Rep 145 (1854) and introducing the 
concept of “penalty defaults” while also highlighting the complexity of ascertaining whether a contractual gap 
exists in the first place). 
77 According to the mainstream view adopted by the House of Lords in Kirin-Amgen [2005] RPC 169 at 188 per 
Lord Hoffmann, the development of the principles governing claim construction may be narrated as a story of 
how case law left an initial stage of strict acontextual literalism behind. Others have argued that this has never 
been the case and that claims had always been construed in context. See, R. Jacob, “Interpretation of claims 
and infringement” in M. Vitoria (ed.), The Patents Act 1977 – Queen Mary College Patent Conference Papers 
(London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1978) p 67; H. Laddie, “Kirin Amgen – The end of equivalents in England?” (2009) 
40 IIC 3, 8-12. For the purposes of this article, we refer to the law as it had developed and stood until the 
Supreme Court rendered its decision in Actavis v Eli Lilly as the “traditional British approach.” 
utilised the essence, the “pith and marrow”, of the same inventive concept.78 Under the doctrine of 
“pith and marrow”, which had already been established before claims became mandatory under the 
Patents, Designs and Trade Marks Act 1883, the courts would practically examine whether any 
dissimilarities between the two products concealed a disguised attempt to evade liability for patent 
infringement. Accordingly, the presence of variations pertaining to inessential elements of the 
claimed invention was treated as a proxy for opportunism. In practice, the application of the 
doctrine leaned towards literalism as it was presumed that the use of narrow language was meant to 
exclude variants not covered by the unambiguous meaning of the terms used in the claims. In Van 
der Lely v Bamfords,79 the plaintiff sought to enforce a patent on a hay-raking machine that was 
convertible to a swathe turner. The claims taught an arrangement whereby the “hindmost” wheels 
could be moved parallel to the original wheel row to become adjacent to the “foremost” wheels of 
the rake. A machine operating under the same principle was deemed as non-infringing because it 
achieved the same practical utility through an analogous adjustment, which required its front wheel-
set to be repositioned.80 Just a few years later, the House of Lords ruled in another case that 
substituting the U-shaped connectors of a patented expandable bracelet for C-shaped links did not 
amount to infringement after applying the same principles. At this early stage, UK patent law was 
therefore characterised by a strong adherence to the literal meaning of the claims. The doctrine of 
“pith and marrow” served as a safety valve against a specific form of blatant opportunism wherein a 
third party would introduce insubstantial variations to a product embodying the teachings of an 
earlier patent in an attempt to escape liability for patent infringement.81 
To avoid the undesired consequences of strict literalism courts endorsed the principle of purposive 
construction. As per its very purpose, the patent specification is not meant to address everyone but 
only those who are skilled in the relevant art to teach them how the invention claimed therein could 
be practised. Drafting costs would have undermined the efficiency of the patent disclosure if the 
                                                          
78 William Clark v Patrick Adie (1877) 2 App. Cas. 315 at 320, per Lord Cairns (noting also that the same 
principle would be applicable to the case where a third party would appropriate a part of a complex product or 
a step of a patented process which was inventive in itself). 
79 C. Van Der Lely N.V. v Bamfords Ltd. [1963] RPC 61 HL. 
80 Van Der Lely [1963] RPC 61 at 77-78, per Viscount Radcliffe. 
81 Van Der Lely [1963] RPC 61 at 78, per Viscount Radcliffe: ‘[t]he application of this principle is from first to last 
directed to the prevention of abuse of patent rights by colourable evasion : it is not a special or “benevolent” 
method of construing an uncertain claim : and I think that he is right to remind us that the basic duty of the 
patentee to state clearly what is the invention for which he seeks protection and the modem practice of 
building up patent claims by a meticulous accumulation of separate or combined elements has left a good deal 
less room for a patentee to complain of abuse, where there is no textual infringement, than may have been 
allowed to him at some periods in the past.” (Emphasis added). An illustrative example of a failed attempt to 
impermissibly ensnare the inventive concept disclosed in an earlier patent can be found in Marconi v British 
Radio Telegraph & Telephone Co [1911] RPC 181. Marconi’s improved wireless telegraphy system consisted of 
two separate devices, the transmitter and the receiver. In that new system, he substituted the single circuit 
featured in both the transmitter and the receiver for a pair of circuits. At the transmission station, one circuit 
would persistently generate electrical oscillations and function as a conserver of energy allowing those 
oscillations to build up inside it while remaining closed. Once the oscillating circuit was open, the second 
circuit would readily absorb and radiate. The circuits at the receiving end would respectively absorb and 
accumulate oscillations in a similarly efficient fashion. Marconi’s improvements increased the transmission 
range through the achievement of stronger signals and more effective reception. Circuits were connected by 
means of another unit called the transformer, which is used to transfer energy between circuits. There are 
different types of transformers. The patent specification made reference to a two-coiled transformer. A 
competitor marketed a wireless telegraph drawing upon the same inventive idea but using an auto-
transformer to pair circuits instead. In the end, the patent was held infringed because the variation introduced 
by the defendant was deemed as pertaining to an inessential feature of the claimed invention. 
applicant were under an obligation to describe the invention to the technically unlearned. Thus, it is 
the perspective of the skilled addressee that matters. Such a person has no propensity for ascribing 
to patent claims the dictionary or conventional meaning of their wording. 
First and foremost, the notion of the skilled addressee is a legal fiction.82 By imputing specific 
attributes to that hypothetical person, patent law seeks to induce applicants and third parties to act 
in accordance with standards of reasonableness. Applicants must determine the subject matter of 
protection with sufficient clarity and precision identifying the sine qua non elements of their 
inventions. Third parties, on the other hand, are expected to inquire upon the patentee’s intention 
as this manifests itself in the patent claims to take due consideration of his legitimate interests. For 
reasons of legal certainty, however, there must be a certain point where users would be entitled to 
plan their course of action rightfully assuming that they have accurately ascertained the scope of the 
earlier patent. 
It is taken for granted that the skilled person reads patent specifications being aware that the 
purpose of the claims is to define the scope of the patent monopoly. He would contemplate whether 
the use of a very specific term has been intended by the patentee to exclude minor variants known 
to exist at the date of publication which could have no material effect on the way the invention 
works. When confronted with narrow claim language, the notional addressee would cogitate on the 
reasons explaining why the patentee did not choose a wording that includes equivalents known at 
the relevant date. In other words, the skilled person may not light-heartedly assume that the 
omitted variant falls outside the exclusionary scope of the patent unless there is some concrete 
indication that the patentee had reasons to exclude it.83 Although the hypothetical person is familiar 
with the function of the claims, he is untutored in patent law.84 Hence, there will be no rumination 
about whether any limitations present in the claims might have emerged during the stage of patent 
prosecution to steer clear of an examiner’s objection as to the patentability of the invention claimed. 
However, when it comes to variants that are unknown to both to the patentee and the skilled 
addressee at the publication date, third parties are entitled to assume without further ado that they 
lie outside the scope of the patent. 
All those personality traits of the man skilled in the relevant art had been engineered and assembled 
together by the courts over a long line of precedents culminating in Catnic, the case that firmly 
established the principle of purposive interpretation in UK patent law.85  
Given that the angulated variant used by the defendant did not materially alter the load bearing 
capacity of its lintel, there was no way the person skilled in the art would conclude that the rear 
                                                          
82 Halliburton Energy Services, Inc. v Smith International (North Sea) Ltd [2006] RPC 25 (Pat) at 47, per 
Pumphrey J. 
83 This applies also to the case where the patentee has only disclosed one specific embodiment of his invention  
Virgin Atlantic Airways Ltd v Premium Aircraft Interiors Group [2010] RPC 192 CA (Civ DIv) at 208, per Lord 
Justice Jacob. 
84 For the purposes of patent law his knowledge is therefore partial and to some extent derived from expert 
advice. Hence, it is reasonable to assume that the notional reader knows enough about the law so as to be 
familiar with the function of the claims and the specification. Patentees are deemed, for instance, to be 
acquainted with some patent claim drafting conventions such as the concept of divisional applications. See 
Virgin Atlantic Airways, [2010] RPC 192 at 200, per Lord Justice Jacob. See also Terrell on the Law of Patents 
(London: Sweet and Maxwell, 18th ed. 2016, at 8-48). 
85 Catnic [1982] RPC 183 at 243, per Lord Diplock. The judge was adamant that purposive interpretation had in 
fact been the controlling principle even behind decisions rendered under the “pith and marrow” doctrine as 
the courts had been essentially focusing on finding out what the parties have meant in light of a given context. 
See also T.A. Blanco White, Patents for Inventions (London: Stevens & Sons, 4th ed. 1974) pp.89-90. 
support member described in the claims had to be vertical in a strict literal sense because the 
patentee had intended this to be an essential element of the invention.86 It would have been absurd 
for an applicant to make it so easy for imitators to exploit his inventive idea without running the risk 
of being held liable for patent infringement.87 Circumstances where a third party works towards 
exploiting a patented inventive concept through embodiments featuring minor or insignificant 
variations in respect to the claimed subject matter have been apparently perceived by the court as a 
straightforward proxy for opportunism.88 
Alternatively, the defendant’s product in Catnic was deemed to fall under the wording of the 
patent’s claims were their contextual meaning to be taken into account as it was perceived by the 
skilled addressee who was not a geometer. A builder familiar with the building operation would 
understand the reference to a vertical support member to mean a support member that is 
‘positioned near enough to the exact “geometrical vertical” to enable it in actual use to perform 
satisfactorily all the functions that it could perform if it were precisely vertical.’89 
Following Catnic, British courts had to assess the legality of less straightforward attempts to snatch 
the inventive concept anchored in the claims of an earlier patent. Instead of making insubstantial 
differences to essential elements of claimed subject matter, competitors would design around the 
patent in a manner that involved the use of variants that were significantly different than their 
counterparts in the patent specification. In that scenario, the changes and substitutions made in the 
original patent are important and substantial. Such conduct is not as closely associated with 
opportunism as the activity of colourful imitation but still the attempt to design around the claims of 
a patent may in some instances disguise an opportunistic appropriation of another’s inventive 
concept. The Improver case90 raised exactly that legal problem. 
Reiterating the law at the Patents Court, Mr Justice Hoffmann, as he then was, confirmed that the 
principle of purposive construction established in Catnic was controlling.91 Moreover, he developed 
a structured legal test to facilitate its application, which was formulated as a series of questions:92 
1. Does the variant have a material effect upon the way the invention works? If yes, the 
variant is outside the claim. If no - 
2. Would this (ie that the variant had no material effect) have been obvious at the date of 
publication of the patent to a reader skilled in the art? If no, the variant is outside the claim. 
If yes – 
3. Would the reader skilled in the art nevertheless have understood from the language of 
the claim that the patentee intended that strict compliance with the primary meaning was 
an essential requirement of the invention? If yes, the variant is outside the claim. 
The evidence suggested that the variant used by the defendant was known at the relevant date and 
had no material effect upon the way the invention works. Hence, the first question was answered in 
the negative and the second in the affirmative.93 In answering the third question, which raises the 
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essential question of purposive construction, the judge argued that the adoption of language not 
covering a known equivalent is most likely to be perceived by the skilled addressee as concealing an 
intent to exclude that variant for some clearly identifiable reason unless the broader context 
suggests that the wording of the claims had not been used in accordance with its ordinary 
meaning.94  
The trailhead of that approach had been the assumption that patentees normally do envisage 
functional equivalents to be included into the scope of the claimed monopoly.95 That was 
particularly applicable to the case of minor variants.96 At any rate, there was no interpretative 
presumption stricto sensu operating in patentee’s favor.97 In fact, courts would only consider the 
possibility of the patentee having departed from the use of conventional language if there was some 
“rational basis” for the skilled addressee to assume that this could have been the case indeed.98 
Where claim limitations remain unexplained, it is reasonable to answer the third question in favour 
of the defendant. The skilled addressee has no way of reaching a credible conclusion as to the 
whether the patentee had intended to cover the allegedly infringing variant.99 These observations 
illustrate the adjudication costs associated with contextualism. 
In Improver, it was found that at the crucial date the use of rubber had been associated with 
overwhelming problems of hysteresis and that the plaintiff’s inventors had done no work on rubber 
rods.100 Besides, a rubber rod could not be assembled into the invention’s preferred embodiment, 
which was configured to comprise an arcuate-formed member for plucking hair.101 In the view of the 
court, all this explained the narrow language of the claims and suggested that the patentee had 
intentionally excluded the said variant.102 Hence, there could be no infringement. 
The judge then went on to examine whether the patentee had envisaged the term “helical spring” to 
have a figurative rather than a literal meaning in the sense of a synecdoche or metonymy. 
Specifically, he inquired as to whether the term “helical spring” could, on the basis of a contextual 
interpretation, be interpreted to mean “a class of bendy, slitty rods of which a close-coiled helical 
spring in its primary sense is a striking and elegant example but which includes the defendant's 
rubber rod.”103 Nothing suggested that the term could be reasonably given a generic construction. 
The helical spring had always been known as a distinct mechanical device and there was no further 
indication that the patentee had intended to claim a broader range of equivalents that were not 
associated with such a concrete engineering concept.104 An “equivalents clause” was included as 
part of the description in the patent specification, which clarified that the claimed invention was not 
limited to the details of the illustrative embodiments represented through the drawings but 
encompassed “all variations which come within the meaning and range of equivalency of the claims 
are therefore intended to be embraced therein.”105 It became apparent from that stipulation, 
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according to the judge, that the patentee had itself confined the scope of the patent to those 
variants that fall within the meaning of the claims’ wording.106 
Mr Justice Hoffmann, as he then was, ruled that the outer boundaries of the patent monopoly 
should be determined by the wording of the claims stressing that the ultimate question underlying 
the process of purposive construction “is always whether the alleged infringement is covered by the 
language of the claim.”107 On top of that, he suggested that this proposition finds support in Catnic 
and, and particularly, in Lord Diplock’s contextual interpretation of the term “vertical.”108  
The prevalence of contextual literal interpretation was ultimately confirmed by the House of Lords in 
Kirin-Amgen.109 Not surprisingly, the Court held that the plaintiff’s patent claimed no more than a 
method to produce genetically engineered EPO within a host cell outside the human body. There 
was nothing in the context suggesting that the wording of the claims gave rise to a different 
contextual meaning, which was broader than the meaning conveyed by the conventional use of the 
respective words.110 Speaking in terms of contract theory, the traditional approach in the UK mirrors 
the adoption of a contextualist linguistic default whereby each party may fall back on a broad base 
of extrinsic evidence111 to argue that the contract has been written in “private language”, apparently 
assuming that the benefits of concluding a more efficient contract outweigh the costs of adjudicating 
disputes about the meaning of agreed stipulations.112  
As a structured legal test, the Improver questions facilitate the administration of purposive claim 
construction and reduce the possibility of error in the assessment. Nonetheless, Improver’s three-
prong test falls short of being a universal method for conducting the evaluation dictated by the 
adoption of a purposive approach to claim interpretation. In some instances, it is rather prone to 
distort the results of the assessment. Question two does not work well in cases like Kirin-Amgen 
when the variant used by the defendant rests on a technology that was unknown at the relevant 
date.113 Kirin-Amgen’s process relied on recombinant DNA technology whereas the allegedly 
infringing method to produce EPO deployed gene activation technology. 
It would be unreasonable to make the scope of the right dependent on a presumed ability of the 
patentee to not only foresee future technological developments but also to appreciate how variants 
based on alternative technologies would actually work. On the other hand, it may reasonably be 
expected of the patentee to frame the wording of the claims at a level of generality capable of 
accommodating equivalents driven by technological considerations that are not obvious in the 
patent sense at the crucial date. Hence, in some cases it would better serve the aims of purposive 
interpretation to skip the second question and simply ask whether the patent claims as they stand 
would be understood by the skilled person as encompassing the new variant or not.114 The scope of 
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the patent will even capture inventive variants as long as these can be subsumed under the claims’ 
language. Setting apart the second question did not benefit the plaintiff in Kirin-Amgen since the 
defendant’s process lay outside of the patent claims’ wording.115 
By accepting the inadequacy of the Improver questions to carry out a purposive claim construction, 
the court recognized essentially that the patentee’s ability to envisage future contractual 
contingencies is rather limited. Therefore, the court placed a less onerous burden on the patentee 
by requiring him to formulate the claims at a level that is abstract enough to cover variants that are 
likely to be developed through the advancements of new technologies even though he might not be 
able to teach how these would work in practice. To conclude, determining the scope of patent rights 
by virtue of purposive claim construction alone rests on the assumption that the patentee should 
bear the risk of contractual incompleteness because he is the least cost avoider.116 As the creator of 
the inventive concept, he is supposed to be in the best position to make predictions about future 
equivalents in light of emerging technologies and draft inclusive claims. 
With regard to the problem of opportunism, those principles provide some protection to the 
patentee against attempts to capitalize upon the inventive idea through the proliferation of 
inventive equivalents that were not obvious at the publication date. However, purposive claim 
construction, as conceived in Improver, does not shield the patentee against more subtle forms of 
opportunism such as when a third party skilfully designs around the wording of the patent claims or 
takes advantage of some sort of loophole in their drafting to appropriate the inventive idea.117 
According to Lord Diplock’s pronouncement in Catnic, there is no independent principle of “colourful 
evasion” operating to extend the scope of the patent beyond the contextual meaning of the claims’ 
wording.118 Some cases seem to suggest, however, that there has always been some form of second-
order principle pursuant to which courts would be able to quash any given overt instance of 
opportunism. 
A good example is Henriksen v Tallon.119 Henriksen had invented a ballpoint pen comprising a 
moveable plug, which, according to the claims, “prevents air from contacting the surface of the ink.” 
Air could not flow into the pen’s reservoir and cause the ink stored therein to deteriorate. While the 
ink reservoir of Tallon’s pen was not airtight, the defendant’s product was able to offer a 
comparable utilitarian advantage through a similar plug that reduced the flow of air by 60 per cent. 
The defendant argued that that there was no patent infringement because the plug used by Tallon 
did allow some air to pass through. Acknowledging that the language of the claims was ambiguous, 
the House of Lords ruled in favour of the plaintiff noting that the term “prevents” should be read as 
meaning “prevents for all practical purposes.” Hence, the patent would be infringed by any ballpoint 
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pen utilising a similar mechanism that does not fully block the airflow into the ink reservoir but is 
nonetheless tolerably effective in preserving the ink’s condition by reducing its contact with air. The 
court justified its opinion by invoking a general principle applicable to the construction of documents 
pursuant to which a meaning leading to absurd results should be rejected where there is a choice 
between two possible interpretations.120 A ruling in favour of the defendant would encourage third 
parties to appropriate opportunistically the inventive concept claimed in earlier patents while 
marketing less efficient embodiments of the same idea to keep at arm’s length from infringement 
liability.121 
The plaintiff in Beecham Group v Bristol Laboratories122 owned product and process patents with 
respect to a type of semisynthetic penicillin called ampicillin. Those patents were held infringed by 
the defendant company through the importation of hetacillin, a similar but nevertheless not 
identical substance that would eventually turn into ampicillin when absorbed into the bloodstream 
or after reacting with some other substance prior to administration. In fact, hetacillin was a 
derivative of ampicillin and served as its carrier much like a capsule containing some compound. 
There was no  difference in pharmaceutical efficacy between the two. Borrowing the words of the 
Court of Appeal, the House of Lords noted that defendant’s acts were tantamount to “reproduction 
of the substance ampicillin, albeit temporarily masked.”123 Despite the absence of literal 
infringement, the court ruled for the plaintiff stressing that the “pith and marrow” doctrine is 
directed against the colourable evasion of a patent.124 Its application would therefore strike out any 
disguised attempt to pirate a patented invention. This case suggests that, despite Lord Diplock’s 
subsequent pre-emption of the “pith and marrow” doctrine, a finding of infringement would indeed 
be possible as a matter of precedent in the event of blatant opportunism even when the defendant’s 
product evaded the wording of the claims.125  
The core concern of the traditional approach to patent claim construction in the UK has been to 
robustly promote the value of legal certainty through a focus on a contextual literal interpretation 
while seeking to combat blatant forms of opportunism. Applicants are presumed to be capable of 
drafting optimally inclusive claims. One has the option of infusing a figurative meaning into words of 
common vocabulary or even established technical terms either implicitly through the teachings 
contained in the specification or explicitly through statements clarifying the use of language in the 
claims. What is more, it would also be perfectly possible for them to draft patent claims at such an 
abstract level of generality so as to cover equivalents which are not known to work at the 
publication date. It was perhaps this conviction about the inventor’s ability to draft optimally 
inclusive claims, be it on his own or with the help of expert consultants, which led Lord Hoffmann to 
rule against the patentee in Improver. Not only did the applicant fail in embedding a broader and 
more inclusive contextual meaning into the crucial term transcending its conventional usage but also 
lost the opportunity to secure a wider scope for the patent through the “equivalents clause”, which 
was essentially a blank cartridge the way it was drafted. What Lord Hoffmann probably saw was an 
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economic operator that had floundered in effectively securing its own proprietary interests, not a 
party in need of protection.126 By the same token, he was satisfied in Kirin-Amgen that the principle 
of purposive interpretation offers adequate drafting possibilities for inventors to ward off the 
prospect of their inventive concept being appropriated by someone who will be able to implement 
through means that were technically incomprehensible at the crucial date. Both Improver and Kirin-
Amgen masterfully clarified the law elaborating upon Lord Diplock’s opinion in Catnic without 
subscribing to any of the two extreme positions disapproved by the Protocol.127 Nonetheless, the 
main drawback of the traditional British approach has been that it does not provide for a safety 
valve to protect against opportunism.128 No matter how inclusive the claims might be there will 
always be room for opportunistic manoeuvring around the claims which may not be predictable ex 
ante.129 
Actavis v Eli Lilly and beyond: Infringement by equivalents 
Lord Neuberger apparently suggested that the assessment of patent infringement could not be 
reduced to a matter of claim interpretation because this would inevitably expose the patentee to 
opportunism. He further referred to the outcome of the Improver litigation as an illustrative example 
corroborating this proposition.130 Were the width and breadth of the terms used in the claims to 
conclusively determine the scope of patent rights, the patent system would as a matter of course 
run aground. When assessing infringement claims, the courts should not, according to the ruling of 
the Supreme Court, confine themselves to claim construction but also consider in light of the facts 
and expert evidence which variants should be captured by the exclusionary scope of the patent 
because they achieve substantially the same result in substantially the same the way as the patented 
invention. Thus, patent infringement cases involve two distinct issues. An issue of interpretation, 
which entails a process of claim construction, and an issue of patent scope, which requires an 
analysis of equivalents.131 The second issue is concerned with the appropriation of the patentee’s 
inventive concept.132 After clarifying the law, the Supreme Court held that the products of Actavis 
would infringe Eli Lilly’s patents under the newly introduced doctrine of equivalents.133 
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The distinction between the issue of interpretation and the issue of patent scope reflects a 
distinction between contingencies that are contractible because they can be reasonably predicted by 
the applicant and junctures which are either unpredictable or not easy to envisage at the time where 
the patent claims were drafted. As it makes provision for non-contractible contingencies and applies 
if the parties have not contracted to the contrary, the doctrine of equivalents possesses all the 
characteristics of a default rule. Furthermore, the doctrine of equivalents harnesses the unruly 
principle of fairness, which is normatively binding as a result of the Protocol’s mandate for fair 
protection of the patentee, by specifying the particular circumstances under which protection 
against opportunism is warranted. The approach adopted by the Supreme Court avoids the 
administration of a broad interpretative principle in order to apply a default rule which is designed 
to protect the party incurring relationship-specific investments. In essence, the formulation of the 
equivalents doctrine transpired with a view to circumventing problems that are analogous to those 
associated with the inefficiency of broad notions of good faith in performing a gap-filling function for 
incomplete contracts.134 
A closer look at the facts of Actavis v Eli Lilly reveals how the doctrine of equivalents effectively 
balances out the patentee’s inability to precisely identify all variants that are capable of 
implementing the inventive concept and draft the wording of the claims in a manner that is 
optimally inclusive. Patent claims may be under-inclusive for various reasons. It may be practically 
impossible to predict every variant that may promote the utilitarian purpose of the invention as 
another surrogate means for achieving the desired technical result. Identifying and specifying all 
those variants may involve prohibitive costs of drafting.135 Such costs may be unreasonable even if 
the drafting of optimally inclusive claims is possible when they are sufficiently high to slow down the 
inventor’s disclosure. In all those instances, the doctrine of equivalents operates as a default rule 
filling gaps in contracts that are attributed to high transaction costs. This point emerges illustratively 
from Actavis v Lilly if one considers the common general knowledge and the innovation efforts 
taking place in the relevant technical field.136 
Pemetrexed belongs to the acid group of antifolates, which are commonly used in cancer 
chemotherapy despite their severe toxicity because their antimetabolic effect is apt to inhibit 
tumour growth. Research and development efforts have been engrossed in dissipating their toxic 
side effects to the utmost feasible extent. Prior to Eli Lilly’s invention it was recognized as a matter of 
common general knowledge that pemetrexed disodium was the only form of the acid that had been 
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shown to be fairly effective and reasonably safe. Getting to a novel salt form of an acid is anything 
but easy. Clues encountered on the way are often polysemous and therefore prone to mislead the 
inquiry. It is not a rare phenomenon to watch a research avenue going to a stalemate. Neither the 
properties nor the production of the new salt itself may be anticipated with a satisfactory degree of 
certainty. Sodium salts are generally associated with relatively lower toxicity and decent solubility. A 
drug’s efficacy is largely a factor of its solubility, which conditions the absorption efficiency of the 
active ingredient by the human organism. Whether alternative salts created through reactions with 
potassium or tromethamine would work in the same way was uncertain. 
Obviously, at the moment it is found that the administration of vitamin B12 in combination with 
pemetrexed disodium is a new and inventive compound which can be used to treat cancer, the most 
efficient route to disclosure goes through the reliance on the inclusion of the base which is already 
known to produce a good folate salt. Requiring the patentee to further inquire upon the 
functionality of other variants and describe them with precision in the specification would delay the 
disclosure of the invention. In fact, the doctrine of equivalents makes it possible for an obligationally 
complete contract to arise at the point in time where it is optimal for the disclosure of the invention 
to take place. The costs of drafting increase even further when the inventor has to consider avoiding 
elements that would destroy the novelty of his invention, render it obvious or vitiate the sufficiency 
of the patent disclosure. In that regard, the patent system encourages inventors to draft their claims 
while taking into account that some future contingencies, for which no provision could be made at 
the drafting stage, will be eventually addressed by the default rule of equivalence. Every applicant 
knows in advance that what he will get amounts to the variant(s) claimed plus equivalents that are 
patentable. Patentees could therefore use narrower language to avoid patentability problems and 
rest assured that they will enjoy the maximum possible protection under the doctrine of equivalents. 
Thus, the new legal framework encourages something akin to incomplete contracting through 
reliance on default rules.137 
Under the equivalence theories, the scope of the patent normally encompasses all variants that 
achieve substantially the same outcome in a substantially similar way except for those whose 
equivalence in terms of effect on the way the invention works was not obvious at the priority 
date.138 Only if the non-obvious, in the aforementioned sense, variants are excluded could it be 
ensured that the breadth of the patent monopoly would be commensurate to the patentee’s 
disclosure. The non-obviousness of the variant’s equivalent function provides a considerable degree 
of certainty with regard to the scope of the property right and, at the same time, constitutes a good 
proxy for the lack of opportunism on behalf of the alleged infringer. On the other hand, it is fair -in 
the sense that the Protocol uses this term- to internalize all equivalent variants that were obvious at 
the priority date to the benefit of the patentee by virtue of his exclusive right. 
Considering the difficulties in producing an acidic salt for therapeutic purposes, however, this 
principle is likely to do injustice to the patentee’s legitimate interests. He may envisage loads of 
variants that may come into play as alternatives but due to the unpredictability of the chemical 
reactions it would be uncertain to him how many and which of those would turn out to be workable 
in the end. For this reason, most of the variants contemplated by the patentee would be deemed 
non-obvious, in the aforementioned sense, as it may not have been possible at the priority date to 
tell with certainty that the invention would work if practiced by using one of the variants that could 
potentially be relied upon. To deal with this problem, the Supreme Court ruled that the assessment 
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of patent infringement should proceed on the assumption that at the priority date the skilled 
addressee is privy to the way a known variant works. Obviousness will be assessed in light of such 
knowledge.139 Had this default rule not been in place, the patentee would have had to try out 
different variants ensuring that they work before drafting the claims. Again, by reducing the 
transaction costs that must be incurred to achieve an obligationally complete patent bargain it is 
envisaged that optimal patent disclosure will be achieved. Notably, the doctrine of equivalents 
would internalize to the benefit of the patentee variants that would have been inventive at the 
crucial date. This is corollary to the notion of protecting an inventive concept.140  
Getting back to the contract theories addressing the problem of hold up, UK law seems to strongly 
adhere to the property rights theory as it creates a strong property right in an inventive concept 
which is defined broadly and protected at a rather high level of abstraction.141 Of course, that right is 
not absolute. Variants that are non-obvious at the crucial date will not be protected, for instance, 
and the patentee will eventually not be able to rely on equivalents to ensnare prior art.142 Given that 
a finding of infringement by equivalents requires the administration of a standard-like rule, theories 
of equivalence could be perceived as contractual arrangements in the form of default rules that are 
designed to give rise to a complete contact. 
While the primary concern of the equivalence theory established by the Supreme Court in Actavis is 
to secure a profit-maximizing opportunity to the patentee by effectively protecting the inventive 
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pumping unit. The feed manifold of each individual unit communicates with a central manifold feed which is 
connected to the refrigeration unit. In turn, the discharge manifold of each individual unit communicates with 
a central discharge manifold. Coolant material would therefore reach the pipes of each individual unit through 
the individual feed manifold of such a unit. For the rest, the defendant’s system equally relied on joint 
members to render its u-shaped pipes foldable. LJ Kitchin, as he then was, found infringement by equivalents. 
While Icescape’s product could not be subsumed under the claims’ wording which referred to a specific kind of 
connection between the manifolds, it was evident that the nature of that connection was inessential to the 
inventive concept. To do justice to the patentee, the determination of the inventive concept was not somehow 
constrained by the breadth of the claims but was rather conducted in light of the underlying problem, which 
consisted in the design of an ice rink that could be disassembled to form different surface areas depending on 
the purpose of the individual use. See also Regen Lab [2019] R.P.C. 121 at 169–170, per Hacon J. 
142 Fisher, Interpretation and Scope of Protection (2007) pp.389-91; L. Bently, B. Sherman, D. Gangjee, and P. 
Johnson, Intellectual Property Law (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 5th ed. 2018) p.666. 
concept emerging from the patent specification, it does not neglect to appropriately consider the 
need to guarantee a reasonable degree of certainty for third parties as required by the Protocol. 
Compared to the previous legal framework, though, which rested solely on the principle of 
purposive construction, the current approach makes significant concessions to the degree of 
certainty as to the scope of the patent monopoly that third parties may reach after reading the 
specification. The use of very narrow claim language could not anymore be taken as a strong 
indication of the patentee’s intention to denounce the strict compliance with the wording of the 
patent claims as an essential element of his invention.143 What is more, variants are protected even 
if it is overtly clear that they could not possibly be subsumed under the claims’ wording. There is no 
way of arguing, for instance, that the literal meaning of the term pemetrexed disodium could be 
stretched to include pemetrexed dipotassium. Moreover, contextual arguments revolving around 
the contrast between the extensively broad teachings of the specification and the conspicuously 
narrow language of the claims would not generally let the defendants off the hook. Eli Lilly’s patent 
made general references to the use of antifolates in cancer treatments which were followed by a 
claim pinned down to one single pemetrexed salt. It seemed as if the reason why pemetrexed salts 
were not referred to as class in the patent specification was because the fact that there could be 
many salt forms of the same acid was commonly known in the relevant field. Hence, the very specific 
reference to a single cation could not be irrefutably perceived as a manifestation of the patentee’s 
intention to confine the scope of the claimed right to pemetrexed disodium alone. Assuming that 
there was no reference to antifolates whatsoever in the specification, the argument for such a 
narrow patent scope would have been, in Lord Neuberger’s view, stronger but still not conclusive. 
In short, unless the patentee himself confines the scope of the claimed right to some specifically 
mentioned variant(s) through the use of unequivocal language to that effect, he would not be 
deprived of the enhanced protection granted under the doctrine of equivalents. From the 
perspective of contract theory, the approach taken by the Supreme Court reflects the notion that 
default rules aimed at primarily protecting one of the parties to the contract –in our case the party 
that makes relationship-specific investments144– could only be abrogated with the consent of that 
party. To ensure that default rules serve their purpose, their abrogation is often hinged on the 
observation of a formality.145 In similar fashion, the Supreme Court chose to place less emphasis on 
the language of the claims to secure the internalization of equivalent variants to the benefit of the 
patentee as a default rule of the patent bargain.146 
As it was necessary for structuring the administration of the test for patent infringement and the 
avoidance of error costs, the court reformulated the Improver questions. Lower courts must now 
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make the following inquiries when assessing the infringement of patents under the doctrine of 
equivalents:147 
i) Notwithstanding that it is not within the literal meaning of the relevant claim(s) of the 
patent,148 does the variant achieve substantially the same result in substantially the same 
way as the invention, ie the inventive concept revealed by the patent? 
ii) Would it be obvious to the person skilled in the art, reading the patent at the priority 
date, but knowing that the variant achieves substantially the same result as the invention, 
that it does so in substantially the same way as the invention? 
iii) Would such a reader of the patent have concluded that the patentee nonetheless 
intended that strict compliance with the literal meaning of the relevant claim(s) of the 
patent was an essential requirement of the invention?  
Default contractual arrangements may take the form of rigid rules or rather flexible standards. The 
latter option is appropriate where, due to the complexity of the issue that needs to be addressed, a 
case-by-case balancing exercise has to take place so that all interests involved are squarely 
considered. Structured legal tests also tend to reduce the probability of errors in the application of 
the law by lower courts as indicated above. Assessing patent infringement by equivalents requires 
the courts to enmesh in the administration of a standard-like default rule. 
In Actavis, the Supreme Court jettisoned the notion that the patentee, as the least cost avoider, has 
to bear the burden of drafting optimally inclusive claims. Under the new approach, third parties 
wishing to appreciate the scope of a relevant patent in order to plan their course of action are 
expected to inquire upon equivalent variants to a reasonable extent.149 
In the patent bargain context, the contractual value reaches its maximization point when protection 
against infringement by equivalents is provided. The patentee gets an opportunity to internalize the 
full market value of the inventive concept claimed and the state secures the strongest incentives for 
innovation. It is in the interest of both parties to the contract to act towards maintaining the 
contractual value. Instead of placing an insurmountable burden on the patentee to draft optimally 
inclusive claims that provide absolute certainty as to the scope of the patent, the doctrine of 
equivalents requires both the inventor and third parties to exercise care so as to avoid the reduction 
of the contract’s value. For the sake of granting protection that allows the patentee to reap the full 
market value of the invention claimed, the law induces third parties through the threat of liability for 
patent infringement to exercise due care by exerting their own individual efforts to ascertain the 
scope of monopoly. That is to say that the doctrine of equivalents establishes a system whereby all 
parties to the contract have to exercise care towards the maintenance of the contractual value. A 
similar structure exists in tort law to induce both injurers and victims to exercise due care in order to 
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reduce the total costs of accidents through appropriate standards of liability.150 Hence, instead of 
arguing that the new law generates uncertainty, it would be fair to say that it simply requires third 
parties to be more diligent in calculating the risk of infringing earlier rights. 
Conclusion 
As emphasized by Lord Justice Floyd, it is now undisputed that Article 69(1) EPC does not mandate a 
purely interpretative approach by stipulating that the extent of protection conferred by a European 
patent shall be determined by the claims.151 Still, the patent claims retain their notice function. The 
scope of the patent would after all encompass variants that are equivalent to the subject matter 
covered by the contextual meaning of the claims. 
Securing robust legal protection for an inventive concept rather than for some specific embodiments 
of it that fall within the wording of the claims, the doctrine of equivalents represents a strong 
adherence to the incentive theory of patents. The decision of the UK Supreme Court in Actavis v Eli 
Lilly is indeed driven by sound economic reasoning. This paper suggests that a more formal and 
doctrinal justification for the doctrine of equivalents emerges from the contractarian view of the 
patent grant. Inventors are accordingly perceived as parties induced to make relationship-specific 
investments through an enforceable promise that they will be able to fully internalize the market 
value of their inventive ideas. Equivalence theories feature economic functions usually fulfilled by 
default rules in the context of incomplete contracts. They seek to remedy the problem of high 
transaction costs arising from the applicant’s inability to foresee all future contingencies and design 
optimally inclusive patent claims. In addition, such decreases in the cost of drafting (transaction 
costs) tend to accelerate patent disclosure. Incentives to innovate are secured against a form of 
“subtle opportunism” whereby a third party skillfully evades the wording of the claims to effectively 
utilize the inventive concept disclosed by the patentee. 
While primarily concerned with maintaining proper incentive structures for individual patentees, the 
Supreme Court did not lose sight of the broader implications of patent scope for the innovative 
activity of other inventors and the effectiveness of the competitive process in general. The tradeoffs 
underlying the assessment of infringement by equivalents under the Protocol are particularly 
complex. As Lord Neuberger observed, “there is an unavoidable tension between the 
appropriateness of giving an inventor a monopoly and the public interest in maximising 
competition.”152 In that regard, competition concerns would be particularly severe when the breadth 
of patent scope threatens to stifle cumulative innovation.153 Lord Neuberger’s opinion seems to 
suggest that such considerations form part of the standard lower courts would have to administrate 
in order to decide patent infringement cases in the future.154 
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The decision of the UK Supreme Court in Actavis v Eli Lilly gives the impression of a retreat from the 
traditional position of interpreting claims in a manner that mirrors the construction of other legal 
documents including commercial contracts. Nevertheless, for the reasons outlined above, the 
doctrine of equivalents fully comports with the contractarian view of the patent grant. The patent 
bargain may be perceived as a point of logical departure, a topos, wherefrom one could examine the 
accuracy of a statement through deductive reasoning.155 In that regard, the patent bargain theory 
has already been proven instrumental to the firm establishment of the requirement to submit a 
written specification.156 If the patent grant is based on consent granted in the prospect of societal 
utility gains, the argument goes, there must be a written specification teaching how the patented 
article can be manufactured.157 It has been astutely observed that the rationale behind the 
requirements of sufficiency and enablement is “the consummation of the patentee’s bargain with 
the State.”158 The same applies to the doctrine of equivalents. The conceptualization of patents as 
relational contracts elucidates and offers an additional justification for a very specific and complex 
rule of patent law such as the doctrine of equivalents. When dealing with interpretative problems or 
addressing issues of contractual incompleteness pertaining to relational contracts one needs to have 
recourse to the nature of the underlying relationship. In the patent law context, this further requires 
consideration of the trade-offs immanent to the incentives-access paradigm. Hence, contract theory 
may facilitate the derivation of de lege lata arguments based on legal reasoning. Therein lies the 
great normative value and the analytical strength of the patent bargain theory. 
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